A one-sided limit order book is modeled as a noncooperative game for several players. An external buyer asks for an amount X > 0 of a given asset. This amount will be bought at the lowest available price, as long as the price does not exceed a upper bound P . One or more sellers offer various quantities of the asset at different prices, competing to fulfill the incoming order. The size X of the order and the maximum acceptable price P are not a priori known, and thus regarded as random variables. In this setting, we prove that a unique Nash equilibrium exists, where each seller optimally prices his assets in order to maximize his own expected profit.
Introduction
A bidding game related to a continuum model of the limit order book was recently considered in [4] , proving the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium and determining the optimal strategies for the various agents. In the basic model, it is assumed that an external buyer asks for a random amount X > 0 of a given asset. This external agent will buy the amount X at the lowest available price, as long as this price does not exceed an upper bound P . One or more sellers offer various quantities of this same asset at different prices, competing to fulfill the incoming order, whose size is not known a priori. strategy, maximizing his expected payoff. Because of the presence of the other sellers and of the upper bound P , asking a higher price for an asset reduces the probability of selling it.
Aim of the present paper is to advance the analysis in [4] in three main directions:
(i) Consider a more realistic model where the maximum acceptable price P is a random variable, not known a priori.
(ii) Study the average reduction in the asked price, resulting from the competition among sellers.
(iii) Introduce a dynamics in the pricing strategies and study the asymptotic stability of the Nash equilibrium.
We assume that the random variable X, describing the amount of stock that the external agent wants to buy, has a distribution function P rob.{X ≥ s} = ψ(s) (1.1)
for which the following holds.
(A1) The map s → ψ(s) is continuously differentiable and satisfies
(ln ψ(s)) ′′ ≥ 0 for all s > 0 . Left: a probability distribution for the random variable X, describing the size of the incoming order. Right: a probability distribution for the random variable P , describing the maximum price that the buyer is willing to pay.
Differently from [4, 5, 6] , we here assume that the maximum price P that the buyer is willing to pay is not known a priori. We thus model P as a random variable, independent of X, with a distribution function h(s) . = P rob.{P ≥ s} (1.5)
which satisfies the following assumptions.
(A2) The function s → h(s) is continuous, continuously differentiable for s ∈ ]p 0 , p max [ , and satisfies
h(s) = 1 for s ≤ p 0 , h(s) = 0 for s ≥ p max , h ′ (s) < 0 for p 0 < s < p max , (ln h(s)) ′′ < 0 for p 0 < s < p max .
(1.6)
For example, one may assume that the random variable P is uniformly distributed over the interval [p 0 , p max ]. This leads to
(1.7)
In our model we assume that the i-th player owns a total amount κ i of asset, which will be labelled by the variable β ∈ [0, κ i ]. He can put all of it on sale at a given price, or offer different portions at different prices. His strategy will be described by a nondecreasing function
Here φ i (β) is the price asked for the asset β.
In the first part of the paper we prove the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium [9] , where the pricing strategy of each player yields the maximum expected payoff, given the strategies adopted by all other players. An explicit formula for these pricing strategies is provided.
We also consider the limit of these Nash equilibria, as the number of players n → ∞, while the total amount of assets put on sale remains bounded. This part of our analysis extends the earlier results in [4] to the case where the upper bound P is a random variable.
In Section 4 we study how the average asked price decreases as a result of the competition among sellers. As shown in Theorem 5, the pricing strategies in the Nash equilibria satisfy:
• If n competing agents put on sale different amounts κ 1 ≤ · · · ≤ κ n of asset, the average price is larger then in the case where each agent offers the same amount (κ 1 +· · ·+κ n )/n.
• For n competing agents, each putting on sale the same amount κ/n of asset, the average price decreases as either n or κ increase.
• For a fixed number of sellers n ≥ 2, if each agent has the same amount κ/n of asset to put on sale, the average price approaches p 0 as κ → ∞.
In Section 5 we introduce a dynamics, describing how the pricing strategies may evolve in time, if they are away from a Nash equilibrium. More precisely, let
be the expected payoff for the i-th player, achieved by putting asset β on sale at price φ(β). If ∂ ∂φ J i (φ(β), β) = 0, then this expected payoff can be increased by suitably modifying the asked price φ(β). We thus consider the following systems of evolution equations, corresponding to a gradient flow:
Notice that, if φ(β) yields the maximum expected payoff, then the necessary conditions yield ∂ ∂φ J i (φ(β), β) = 0, and the right hand side of (1.8) vanishes. In case of a Nash equilibrium, this is true for every β ∈ [0, κ i ] and every i.
Our main concern is the asymptotic behavior of solutions to the system (1.8). In the cases of (i) infinitely many small players and (ii) two large players, with initial strategies satisfying a specific inequality assumption, we prove that, as t → ∞, the pricing strategies asymptotically converge to the unique Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, for any number n ≥ 2 of players, if the initial strategies have disjoint price ranges, we show that the solution to the system (1.8) converges to a different limit.
In addition to the classical paper [9] , for an introduction to non-cooperative games and Nash equilibria we refer to [3, 8, 14, 15] .
In the case where sellers have different beliefs about the fundamental value of the asset and on the distribution of the random order X, the equilibrium pricing strategies have been studied in [5, 6] .
In the literature on mathematical finance, various models of the limit order book have been recently studied, mainly from the point of view of the agents who submit the limit orders. In [11, 13, 7] prices range over a discrete set of values, while in [10, 12, 1] prices are continuous and the shape of the limit order book is described by a density function. An important achievement of these models is that, as soon as the shape of the limit order book is given, this in turn determines a corresponding price impact function, describing how the bid and ask prices change after the execution of a market order.
In the present model, as well as in [4, 5, 6] , prices are allowed to vary in a continuum of values but the shape of the limit order book is not given a priori. Indeed, this shape can be endogenously determined as the unique Nash equilibrium, resulting from the optimal pricing strategies implemented by the selling agents. In this case, is the new seller adopts the pricing strategy φ, his expected payoff will be
[profit from the sale of asset β] × [probability of selling asset β] dβ
Remark 1. We regard p 0 as the fundamental value of the asset. To every agent, keeping the asset or selling it at price p 0 is indifferent. A profit is achieved only by selling at a higher price.
Remark 2. In the case where two or more sellers put a positive amount of assets for sale at exactly the same price p * , one needs to specify who sells it first. In our model, this happens when Φ has an upward jump at p * , and the set {β ; φ(β) = p * } has positive measure. By taking Φ left continuous at p * we model the case where the new seller has priority (i.e., his assets priced at p * are sold before those of the other agents). By taking Φ right continuous at p * we model the case where the other agents have priority.
In the case of a Nash equilibrium, however, this situation never happens. Indeed, since in our model the prices range continuously over the interval [p 0 , p max ], the agent which does not have priority can always improve his expected payoff by selling at a slightly lower price p * − ε.
In this section we derive necessary and sufficient conditions in order that the pricing strategy φ be optimal. From the modeling assumptions (A2) it it obvious that an optimal strategy should satisfy
Indeed, selling at price ≤ p 0 can only produce a loss, while the probability of selling at price ≥ p max is zero. In addition, if the function p → Φ(p) is smooth, for each β ∈ [0, κ], the optimal price φ(β) will satisfy the necessary condition
Introducing the function
we see that (2.4) is equivalent to
Remark 3. From the assumptions (A1)-(A2) it follows that the function
is strictly decreasing on the open interval ]p 0 , p max [ and there exists a unique point
Moreover, on the interval [p 0 , p * ] where Q ≥ 0, the assumption (1.3) implies
In the special case where ψ(s) = e −λs , the formula (2.5) simplifies to
Notice that in this case the right hand side is independent of β. We also observe that, if h is the function in (
The following theorem extends the necessary condition (2.6) to the case where Φ is a nondecreasing function. Since the proof is the same as for Theorem 4.2 in [4], we omit details.
Theorem 1 (necessary conditions for optimality).
Let the functions ψ, h satisfy the assumptions (A1)-(A2), and let Φ :
is an optimal pricing strategy, then for almost every
To obtain the existence and an explicit description of the Nash equilibrium, the following result will be used. • The function Φ(·) is Lipschitz continuous on [p 0 , φ(β)]. Moreover, its derivative satisfies
Proof. 1. For any given β ∈ [0, κ], consider the map
describing the expected payoff achieved by putting the asset β on sale at price p. We observe that
Moreover, since Φ is nondecreasing and can have only upward jumps, while ψ is decreasing, the map (2.13) can only have downward jumps. More precisely, for any
(2.14) Notice that equality holds as long as p 2 ≤ φ(β), because by assumption Φ is Lipschitz continuous on [p 0 , φ(β)]. On the other hand, by (2.12) the integrand in (2.14) is ≤ 0 for p ∈ [φ(β), p max ]. Hence the map p → J(p, β) is nonincreasing on [φ(β), p max ], possibly with downward jumps.
We conclude that, for a.e. β ∈ [0, κ], the function J(·, β) achieves its global maximum at p = φ(β). This implies the optimality of the pricing strategy φ(·).
3 Nash equilibria 3.1 Finitely many competing sellers.
We now consider n sellers competing against each other. We assume that i-th agent has an amount κ i of assets to offer for sale. His pricing strategy will be described by the function
be the total amount of assets offered by all other agents j = i at price < p. Then the expected payoff for agent i is
Definition. An n-tuple of pricing strategies (φ 1 , . . . , φ n ) is a Nash equilibrium if each φ i yields the maximum expected payoff (3.2) to the i-th player, given the function Φ i determined by the strategies of all other players. Notice that the optimal strategy β → φ i (β) for the i-th player must satisfy the necessary condition
Of course, this is the same as (2.4), with Φ replaced by Φ i .
To determine these equilibrium strategies, it is convenient to introduce the functions
Notice that the U i provides a generalized inverse to the function φ i : [0, κ i ] → IR describing the strategy of the i-th player (see Fig. 3 ). Indeed, up to sets of measure zero, one has
Let 0 < κ 1 ≤ κ 2 ≤ · · · ≤ κ n be the amounts of asset put on sale by the various players. We will show that the Nash equilibrium strategies are obtained as follows. 
with terminal condition
Here the points p 0 < p 1 ≤ p 2 ≤ · · · ≤ p n are inductively determined by
For notational convenience, we here define κ 0 = 0. STEP 2. For i = 1, . . . , n − 1 the optimal strategy U i is Lipschitz continuous and satisfies
(3.8)
Moreover,
In other words, Player n puts an amount κ n − κ n−1 of assets for sale all at the price p n = p * , while his remaining assets are priced in the same way as Player n − 1. Proof. 1. We begin by proving that the function U and the points p i are uniquely determined by the equations (3.5)-(3.7). For this purpose, we shall use backward induction on i = n, n − 1, . . . , 2, 1.
The first step is to solve the backward Cauchy problem
for p < p n = p * , with terminal condition U (p n ) = κ * defined at (3.6). Observe that the right hand side of (3.10) is strictly positive. Moreover, since the function
is not integrable, we have lim
Therefore, there exists a unique point p n−1 such that
This provides the first inductive step.
Next, assume that U has been constructed on the interval [p j+1 , p * ]. If j = 0 we are done. Otherwise, the function U can be extended backwards on the additional interval [p j , p j+1 ] by solving the Cauchy problem
for p < p j+1 , with terminal condition at p = p j+1 provided by the inductive step. As before, the solution U of this ODE is strictly increasing and satisfies (3.11) . Hence there exists a unique point p j such that
This achieves the inductive step of our construction.
By induction, we thus obtain a function p → U (p), defined for p ∈ [p 1 , p * ], with
We then set
2. We now show that the bidding strategies U 1 , . . . , U n in (3.4), determined by (3.5)-(3.9) provide a Nash equilibrium. Fix any i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and consider the function
According to our construction, the i-th player puts his asset β ∈ [0, κ i ] on sale at a price φ(β) which satisfies
We claim that this price is optimal. Indeed, the sufficient conditions in Theorem 2 are satisfied.
To fix the ideas, assume first that
By Theorem 2, φ is an optimal strategy.
3. The uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium is proved in the same way as in [4] . For this reason, we only summarize the main steps of the proof.
Consider any Nash equilibrium, and let U 1 , . . . , U n describe the strategies of the various sellers, as in (3.4). Let U (p) . (ii) For all except at most one index i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the function U i is globally Lipschitz continuous.
(iii) There exists a minimum asking price p A and a constant δ 0 > 0 such that
Next, by Rademacher's theorem every function U i is a.e. differentiable on the interval [p A , p * ]. For any p, consider the subset of indices
and call N (p) = #I(p) the cardinality of this set. This function is a.e. well defined, and Lebesgue measurable. From the necessary conditions it follows that the function U satisfies the ODE
As in the proof of Theorem 8.2 in [4] one can show that, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the set of prices where the i-th player offers assets for sale is an interval of the form [p A , p i+1 ]. Moreover,
As a consequence, the functions U i , i = 1, . . . , n, are uniquely determined by the ODEs (3.5) and (3.8), together with the equations (3.6), (3.7), and (3.9). This achieves the proof of uniqueness. For all details, we refer to [4] . Example 1. In the special case where ψ, h are given by (1.4) and (1.7), for any 0 < κ 1 ≤ · · · ≤ κ n the Nash equilibrium solution is determined by the equations
with G(p) as in (2.9). Moreover, the points p 1 ≤ · · · ≤ p n are inductively determined by the identities
n − j dp = κ j − κ j−1 (j = 1, . . . , n − 1) .
The case n = 4 is illustrated in Fig. 4 . The optimal strategies u 1 , . . . , u 4 in a Nash equilibrium, assuming ψ(s) = e −λs . Areas of the regions 1, 2, 3, 4 are proportional to the amount of asset put on sale by Players 1, 2, 3, 4 at the given prices. In addition, Player 4 puts an additional amount κ 4 − κ 3 of asset for sale all at the price p * . Notice that, for every i, an optimality condition holds:
Infinitely many competing sellers.
We consider here the limiting case where the number of sellers approaches infinity while the total amount of asset on sale remains bounded. More precisely, for each n ≥ 1, consider amounts 0 < κ
n , and assume that
Let U (n) (p) be the total amount of asset put on sale at price ≤ p (by all players combined) in a Nash equilibrium. If the limits (3.17) hold, then we will show that as n → ∞ one has the uniform convergence
The function U ♯ can be characterized as the unique Lipschitz continuous function such that 
is constant over the interval p ∈ [p A , p * ]. We can thus regard U ♯ (·) as describing the price distribution in a Nash equilibrium with infinitely many small players.
Theorem 5. Under the assumptions (A1)-(A2)
, consider a sequence of Nash equilibria, where as n → ∞ the limits (3.17) hold. Then the corresponding price distributions U (n) converge uniformly to the function U ♯ , defined as the solution to (3.19)-(3.20).
Proof. 1. For each n, the function U (n) is constructed according to (3.5)-(3.7). Therefore
Moreover, U (n) can have a jump at p * . However, by the second assumption in (3.17), the size of this jump goes to zero. Indeed,
Comparing (3.5) with (3.20), we observe that
for every p < p * where both U (n) and U ♯ are strictly positive. This already implies lim sup
2. Given ε > 0, we can find integers m, N large enough so that
Call V ε the solution to
Indeed, recalling (3.5)-(3.7), let
the points determined in the construction of U (n) . By the second inequality in (3.22), for every n > N we have
Moreover, the first inequality in (3.22) implies d dp
Hence (see Fig. 5 , right)
for every p ≤ p * . We now observe that, as ε → 0, the function p → max{V ε (p), 0} converges to U ♯ uniformly on [p 0 , p * ]. This implies
completing the proof.
Price reduction resulting from the competition
In this section we prove some inequalities, showing how the average price asked for the asset decreases as a result of the competition between sellers.
To fix the ideas, consider n sellers, offering the amounts κ 1 ≤ · · · ≤ κ n of asset for sale. Let β → φ i (β) be the corresponding Nash equilibrium pricing strategies. Calling
the total amount of asset for sale, the average asked price is
In the special case where κ 1 = · · · = κ n = κ/n, we write
Theorem 5. Assume that the functions ψ, h satisfy (A1)-(A2). For the Nash equilibrium strategies, the following holds.
(i) For any given κ 1 , . . . , κ n and κ = i κ i , one has
(ii) For any m > n one has
(iii) In the case where ψ(s) = e −λs , for any n ≥ 2 one has Proof. 1. Let U (p) be the total amount of asset put on sale at price ≤ p, jointly by all players.
Observe that, in a Nash equilibrium, this price alway ranges within the interval [p 0 , p * ]. Hence
and the second inequality in (4.3) is obvious. The average price is computed by the Stieltjes integral
In the general case of n players, the function U is Lipschitz continuous for p ∈ [p 0 , p * [ , possibly with a jump at p = p * . Indeed,
For p < p * , according to (3.12) the function U satisfies the ODE
for some integer-valued function j(p) ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}.
On the other hand, call p → U n (p) the total amount put on sale at price ≤ p in the case of n equal players, i.e. with κ 1 = · · · = κ n = κ/n. In this case, the function U n is globally Lipschitz continuous and provides a solution to the Cauchy problem 
Infinitely many small players.
We first consider a model with a very large number of small players, each with a small quantity of assets. Let
be the total amount of assets offered for sale at price < p. Then the expected payoff achieved by offering a unit amount of asset at price p is
If the map p → J(p, U ) is not constant, the agent pricing his asset at p may increase his payoff by varying the price according tȯ
From the above, we obtain a conservation law for the price density u(p) . = U ′ (p), with flux Φ =ṗ · u, namely
The characteristic speed is
Notice that (5.3) is a conservation law with strictly concave flux. Upward jumps provide admissible shocks, while downward jumps are not admissible. Steady states are those where the flux vanishes identically, so that
where G is the function defined at (2.9). Let κ = u(p) dp be the total amount of assets offered for sale. The admissibility conditions imply that a unique steady state exists, namely
Here the points p * , p A ∈ [p 0 , p max ] are uniquely determined by the identities
If u is an entropy-admissible solution of (5.3), then the integrated function
provides a viscosity solution [2] to the evolution equation Proof. 1. Consider the integrated function U in (5.6). By assumption, there exist κ, δ > 0 such that at time t = 0 the initial data
We shall construct a subsolution V and a supersolution W of (5.7) with
A comparison argument will thus yield the convergence U (t, ·) → U ♯ as t → ∞.
2.
As shown in Fig. 6 , the lower and upper solutions V, W will have the form 11) for suitable functions ξ, η. As in Theorem 5, here U ♯ is the unique Lipschitz continuous function such that
12) 
By choosing
we achieve
3. For any ξ > 0, using (5.12)-(5.14) we obtain
If we now choose the map t → ξ(t) satisfyinġ
then the function V in (5.11) will be a lower solution of (5.7) on the domain
Observing that V ≤ U on the parabolic boundary of Ω, i.e. on the set
we conclude that V (t, x) ≤ U (t, x) for all (t, x) ∈ Ω.
4.
Similarly, for any η > 0, using (5.12)-(5.14) we obtain
If we now choose the map t → η(t) satisfyinġ
then the function W in (5.11) will be a lower solution, restricted to the domain Ω in (5.18).
Observing that U ≤ W on the parabolic boundary (5.19) of Ω, we conclude that V (t, x) ≤ U (t, x) for all (t, x) ∈ Ω.
5. Since ξ > 0 and η > 0 imply I(ξ) > 0 and J(η) > 0, the solutions to (5.17), and (5.21) satisfy
Hence V (t, ·) and W (t, ·) both approach U ♯ as t → ∞. Since the inequalities (5.9) hold for every time t ≥ 0 and every p ∈ [p 0 + δ , p max − δ], we obtain the uniform convergence
is now proved by means of Oleinik's estimates. Indeed, recalling that the flux function in (5.3) is a strictly concave function of u, we have an estimate of the form
In particular, for t ≥ 1 the total variation of u(t, ·) is uniformly bounded. As a consequence, the uniform convergence U (t, ·) → U ♯ implies the L 1 convergence (5.22).
Two or more large players.
We consider here the case of n players, with amounts 0 < κ 1 ≤ · · · ≤ κ n of asset to put on sale. Let
be the total amount of asset put on sale at price < p by Player i, and let
. At the initial time t = 0, we assume that the supports of u 1 , . . . , u n are all contained in a compact subset of ]p 0 , p max [ . Consider a situation where each player gradually modifies the prices asked for his assets, in reply to the strategies adopted by all other players. This can be modeled by the system of conservation laws
with i = 1, . . . , n. We think of (5.25) as a system of n gradient flows, in connection with the functionals J i in (3.2) describing the expected payoffs of the various players.
The next example shows that, for general initial data, the solution may not converge to a Nash equilibrium.
Example 2. Assume that the initial data
are smooth and have disjoint supports (as in Fig. 7, left) . Then, as long as the supports of the functions u i (t, ·) remain disjoint, the system (5.25) is equivalent to
In this case, all densities u i satisfy the same linear transport equation. Hence, for every t > 0, the solutions u i (t, ·) remain smooth and with disjoint supports. We now observe that every solution to the ODEṗ 
for some minimum asking price p A . As in step 3 of the proof of Theorem 6, we can construct a subsolution V having the form V (t, p) = U Recalling that U ♯ 1,p (p * ) = G(p * ) = 0, for every small ε > 0 we can find T ε such that 
